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It is easy to get lost. Law students enrolled in introductory antitrust courses know 
this well. Apparently, so does the judiciary. A broad “charter of freedom”1—the 
“Magna Carta of free enterprise”2—the Sherman Act prohibits “every contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy . . . in restraint of trade,” and condemns “every person 
who shall monopolize” any commercial market.3 In that single legislative stroke 
more than a century ago, Congress both attended to public outcry over ravaging 
cartels and sent the judiciary on an expedition into the “wilds of economic theory.”4  
There is little doubt that Congress intended economic regulation under the 
Sherman Act to develop with flexibility—case-by-case, claim-by-claim.5 Yet, given 
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 1. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940). 
 2. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); Appalachian Coals, Inc. 
v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933); see also Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Law as 
Public Interest Law, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 885, 886 (2012) (“The Sherman Act of 1890 is the 
foundational statute of federal antitrust law.”).   
 3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012). 
 4. Topco, 405 U.S. at 609 n.10; see Leslie, supra note 2, at 888. 
 5. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) 
(“From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.”); see 
also 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 301, at 5–7, (4th ed. 
2014); William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common 
Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 661–63 (1982) (arguing that to afford 
flexibility, “Congress adopted what is in essence enabling legislation that has permitted a 
common-law refinement of antitrust law through an evolution guided by only the most general 
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the unusual level of interpretation the Act requires, the effort of supplying the content 
of it’s sweeping prohibitions often bears closer resemblance to formulating policy 
than to deciphering text.6 The result, in the words of Richard Posner, is that the 
judiciary has “made antitrust law out of the cryptic antiquated language of the 
Sherman Act.”7   
Perhaps more than ever, the vagueness of the Sherman Act’s text needs a remedy 
that a century’s worth of judicial gloss has failed to provide. Reliance on the 
customary techniques of judicial reasoning may now make less sense;8 the 
modernization of our economy demands a modernized antitrust regime.9 Decided 
upon more than one hundred years ago, the primarily post-hoc, increasingly fact-
intensive adjudicative approach sent the judiciary roving through the complexities of 
competition economics with far less than a statutory Polaris.10 And after a century-
plus long foray into the complexities of economic competition, it is even possible 
that the judiciary has plunged into the “sea of unconstitutionality.”11  
                                                                                                             
 
statutory directions”). 
 6. See RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 104 
(2016). 
 7. Id. at 107 (emphasis added). Of course, the Sherman Act has been supplemented by 
other statutes—notably, “the equally cryptic Clayton Act.” Id.; see also AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 301, at 6–7. “[T]he use of unelaborated common law words and 
references seems simply to have invested the federal courts with a new jurisdiction.” AREEDA 
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 301, at 6. On one hand, “the Sherman Act . . . could be taken 
as a legislative indication of the proper direction.” On the other hand, the Act “may be seen 
not as a prohibition of any specific conduct but as a general authority to do what common law 
courts usually do.” Id. ¶ 301, at 6–7. 
 8. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 306, at 81 (observing that “judges may 
sometimes be quite far at sea” with such economic concepts as “anticompetitive harm, 
procompetitive redeeming virtues, and less restrictive alternatives”); ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 36 (The Free Press 1993) (1978) 
(arguing that the Sherman Act’s evolution is “controlled by the progress of economic 
understanding”); Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1160 
(2008) [hereinafter Crane, Technocracy] (arguing that antitrust’s technocratic shift should 
continue). 
 9. See generally Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs 
a New Deal, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1247 (2011); see also BORK, supra note 8, at 81. In Bork’s 
estimation, “the problem that arises when antitrust adjudication attempts to reconcile 
inconsistent values on a case-by-case basis should be enough to indicate the impropriety of 
courts undertaking such a function.” BORK, supra note 8, at 81. 
 10. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST 34 (2017) (“[T]he Sherman Act 
condemns ‘every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade,’ or every person 
who shall ‘monopolize,’ without giving a clue about what those phrases mean.”); Robert H. 
Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 48 (1966) (“In 
terms of ‘law’ . . . the Sherman Act tells judges very little.”).  
 11. Andrew S. Oldham, Sherman’s March (In)to the Sea, 74 TENN. L. REV. 319, 325 
(2007). Judge Oldham contends that the modern-day scope of the Sherman Act has entered 
the realm of unconstitutionality in part because the judiciary has misguidedly interpreted the 
Act such that “judges can and should create substantive rules without legislative guidance.” 
Id. In Judge Oldham’s view, this interpretation has “unmoored the Sherman Act from its 
statutory foundations.” Id.; see also infra Part III. 
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Of course, the fact that the Supreme Court retains ultimate interpretive authority 
does not make the judiciary a lone adventurer.12 Enforcement agencies must also 
navigate the economic landscape to give content to the Act’s prohibitions.13 Not only 
does the text of the Act grant the judiciary largely unfettered interpretive leeway, it 
also affords enforcers unsettling discretion to determine whether conduct deserves 
criminal penalties14 or civil remedies.15 But given that the judiciary is generally 
comprised of high-level generalists rather than technology-forward economic 
experts, the judiciary may no longer be best equipped to play the leading role.16 The 
judiciary is certainly apt to reason by way of analogy and precedent, but 
interpretation of the Sherman Act requires that adjudicators and norm-creators 
maintain an updated comprehension of prevailing economic theory and modern 
business practices.17 Faced with emergent technologies and business models that 
                                                                                                             
 
 12. See Oldham, supra note 11, at 320. 
 13. See BORK, supra note 8, at 36 (“Precedent is not ultimately controlling; economic 
argument is.”). The DOJ and the FTC offer economic arguments in a myriad of Sherman Act-
related litigation. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD 
STATISTICS FY 2008–2017, https://www.justice.gv/atr/fi;e/788426/download [https://perma 
.cc/R4TC-TDXG]; FED. TRADE COMM’N, Anticompetitive Practices, https://www.ftc.gov 
/enforcement/anticompetitive-practices [https://perma.cc/WKS9-V4KN].  
 14. The Act’s significantly enhanced criminal penalties loom over imprudent corporate 
executives. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012). A violation committed by a corporation is punishable 
by up to a $100,000,000 fine. Id. Individuals can be fined $1,000,000, imprisoned up to 10 
years, or both. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SHERMAN ACT VIOLATIONS YIELDING A 
CORPORATE FINE OF $10 MILLION OR MORE (last updated June 13, 2018), https:// 
www.justice.gov/atr/sherman-act-violations-yielding-corporate-fine-10-million-or-more 
[https://perma.cc/8KFW-B2FY].  
 15. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZATION, MISSION AND FUNCTIONS MANUAL: 
CRIMINAL DIVISION, https://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-and-functions 
-manual-criminal-division [https://perma.cc/DW8Z-RQWU] (last updated Aug. 31, 2018); see 
also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST 
GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS (2016) [hereinafter NO-POACH GUIDANCE]; 
Karen L. Corman, Karen Hoffman Lent & Tara L. Reinhart, Shifting Enforcement of No-
Poaching Agreements, SKADDEN (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.skadden.com/insights 
/publications/2018/04/quarterly-insights/shifting-enforcement-of-nopoaching-agreements. 
 16. See Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright,  Is Antitrust Too Complicated for 
Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, 
54 J. L. & ECON. 1, 3 (2011); Haw, supra note 9, at 1248; C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate 
Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630 (2009) (“Unfortunately, courts lack the information needed to select 
optimal rules . . . . In selecting an antitrust decisionmaker, moreover, we ought to favor the 
institution that has superior access to aggregate information . . . .”); see also Alex Lipton, 
Supreme Court Justices Just Don’t Understand Tech, SHAKE (June 25, 2014), http://www 
.shakelaw.com/blog/supreme-court-judges-tech/  [https://perma.cc/NZG8-RPVW]; Casey C. 
Sullivan, Judges Know Nothing About Technology, Judge Says, FINDLAW: TECHNOLOGIST 
(July 31, 2015, 10:58 AM),  https://blogs.findlaw.com/technologist/2015/07/judges-know 
-nothing-about-technology-judge-says.html [https://perma.cc/QDB5-4HFA]. 
 17. See Haw, supra note 9, at 1248; Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in 
Antitrust, 158 U. PENN L. REV. 261, 286 (“Judges do not necessarily understand how 
businesses operate, and most judges are unfamiliar with the full sweep of the relevant 
economics literature . . . .”). 
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lend themselves to increased market concentration,18 the regulatory task increasingly 
demands enlightened, data-driven analysis.19 And against the judiciary’s lack of 
economic expertise, the input of expert witnesses and third-party industry 
stakeholders have come to play an important role in the adjudication of Sherman Act 
cases.20  
Yet, even as ideas that were once indubitable have become the subjects of open 
debate,21 none of this is to say that the Act should be tossed out entirely. An updated 
enforcement approach need not completely abandon traditional principles.22 Shifts 
in the regulatory landscape over the past several decades are likely indications that 
the wilds have been tamed in significant ways.23 Still, the combination of a 
widespread decline in competition,24 disagreement over fundamental antitrust 
                                                                                                             
 
 18. See Lina M. Khan, Sources of Tech Platform Power, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 325, 325 
(2018) [hereinafter Platform Power] (“A handful of tech platforms mediate a large and 
growing share of our commerce and communications.”); see also COUNCIL OF ECON. 
ADVISORS, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF MARKET POWER (2016); Paula 
Dwyer, Should America’s Tech Giants Be Broken Up?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 20, 
2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-20/should-america-s 
-tech-giants-be-broken-up; Too Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016), https:// 
www.economist.com/news/briefing/21695385-profits-are-too-high-america-needs-giant 
-dose-competition-too-much-good-thing [https://perma.cc/998Y-PULR].  
 19. Haw, supra note 9, at 1248.  
 20. Id. at 1248, 1287; see also Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust 
Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 50 (2007) [hereinafter Crane, Rules Versus 
Standards] (“Once the stars of the antitrust courtroom, lawyers now play the supporting cast 
to economists.”); Jesse Eisinger & Justin Elliot, These Professors Make More Than a 
Thousand Bucks an Hour Peddling Mega-Mergers, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 16, 2016),  
https://www.propublica.org/article/these-professors-make-more-than-thousand-bucks-hour 
-peddling-mega-mergers [https://perma.cc/F6PS-DH6N] (“Today, lawyers still write the 
briefs, make the arguments and conduct the trials, but the core arguments are over economists’ 
models . . . .”). In fact, the DOJ and FTC even participate as amici in litigation between private 
parties. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 138 S. 
Ct. 2647 (cert. granted June 18, 2018) (No. 17-204), 2018 WL 2131602.  
 21. David Streitfeld, Amazon’s Antitrust Antagonist Has a Breakthrough Idea, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/technology/monopoly-antitrust 
-lina-khan-amazon.html [https://perma.cc/B423-JK4V]. 
 22.  See, e.g., SENATE DEMOCRATS, A BETTER DEAL: CRACKING DOWN ON CORPORATE 
MONOPOLIES (2017), https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017/07/A-Better 
-Deal-on-Competition-and-Costs-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7AM-DELU]; Hearings on 
Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/hearings-competition-consumer-protection [https://perma.cc 
/WKF3-LFWC]. 
 23. Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 50 (“The wilds are being tamed.”).  
 24. See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, The Ideological Roots of America’s Market Power Problem, 
127 YALE L.J. F. 960, 960–61 (2018), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-ideological 
-roots-of-americas-market-power-problem [https://perma.cc/4PZ9-G9KM]. 
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philosophies,25 and swells of public and political fervor26 demands that Congress do 
what it did in 1890: update antitrust’s policy-making approach.27 An additional step 
toward taming the wilds—toward optimizing clarity, predictability, and outcomes 
—might be to shift the task of interpreting the Sherman Act to an antitrust agency.28  
This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I outlines the interpretive difficulties 
spawned by the vagueness of the Sherman Act—particularly, the judiciary’s 
necessary but undeniable departures from the text of the statute and the resulting 
doctrinal confusion. Part II considers ways in which the judiciary’s decision-making 
in Sherman Act cases approximates agency rulemaking and whether it makes sense 
to delegate interpretive authority to an antitrust agency. Yet, while the agency 
solution has upside, it would not easily escape criticisms that the Act does not provide 
sufficient notice of the conduct it proscribes and that the Act is an impermissible 
delegation of legislative authority.29 Part III examines these two hurdles, taking stock 
of separation of powers and void-for-vagueness principles. Part IV concludes. 
I. DOCTRINAL CLARITY—OR NOT  
It has always been true that Sherman Act cases are too complex for the judiciary 
to resolve with strict adherence to a literal reading of the text.30 Because the text itself 
provides little direction, the judiciary has spent more than a century smoothing a 
“judicial gloss” over the Sherman Act’s Constitution-like language.31 When the 
judiciary updates Sherman Act common law with new insights, it acts, therefore, 
much like a legislative body.32 Having spent years attempting to craft bright-line 
                                                                                                             
 
 25. Id. at 964 (“The enfeebled state of antitrust enforcement traces directly to an 
intellectual movement that fundamentally rewrote antitrust law—redefining its purpose, its 
orientation, and the values that underlie it.”). 
 26. Id. at 962, 963; see also Alexei Alexis, ‘Hipster Antitrust’ Comes Under Senate 
Spotlight, BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.bna.com/hipster-antitrust-comes 
-n73014473208 [https://perma.cc/9KAP-U7F9].  
 27. See generally Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017); 
see also Comment of Fed. Trade Comm’r Rohit Chopra, Hearing #1 on Competition and 
Consumer Protection in the 21st Century (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system 
/files/documents/public_statements/1408196/chopra_-_comment_to_hearing_1_9-6-18.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X9MQ-83QB].  
 28. See, e.g., Haw, supra note 9, at 1249 (proposing a delegation of interpretive authority 
to the FTC); see also Comment of Fed. Trade Comm’r Rohit Chopra, supra note 27. 
 29. See Oldham, supra note 11, at 324; see also Emilie F. Athanasoulis, Note, Is the 
Sherman Act Unconstitutionally Vague as a Criminal Statute? A Re-evaluation After Gypsum, 
13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1284, 1289 (1979). 
 30. See Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 51 (“[A]ntitrust cases are too 
complex and socially important to turn on simplistic legal commands.”) 
 31. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); Appalachian 
Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933); ALBERT H. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE 
SHERMAN LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 47 (1910) (“The Sherman Law . . . was 
like the Constitution . . . in that it was expressed in brief, broad and comprehensive language, 
requiring some judicial construction and many diversified applications to different cases for 
its practical development into generally recognized law.”); see also BORK, supra note 8, at 36 
(“[T]he Sherman Act [is] not a set of specific rules, still less a body of precedent . . . .”).  
 32. See Baxter, supra note 5, at 672; Oldham, supra note 11, at 324. 
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rules and standards, courts are fully aware that without such guideposts 
“businessmen would be left with little to aid them in predicting in any particular case 
what courts will find to be legal and illegal under the Sherman Act.”33 But bright-
line rules have not proven to be the most effective tools.34 This Part highlights some 
of the doctrinal and interpretive difficulties spawned by the Act’s sparse guidance. 
A. Departures from the Text  
Generally speaking, Sherman Act section 1 doctrine has been defined by two 
purportedly distinct rules: the per se rule and the rule of reason.35 Conduct such as 
naked price fixing, market allocation, and group boycotting is considered 
irredeemably anticompetive.36 That is, the judiciary has decided that such conduct so 
consistently restrains trade that it violates section 1 regardless of circumstance.37 To 
successfully prove that a defendant committed a per se violation, plaintiffs 
theoretically need only show that the conduct occurred.38 On the other hand, some 
conduct could be considered beneficial to competition in light of extant market 
conditions and other surrounding circumstances. Under the rule of reason, plaintiffs 
must show that the conduct had an anticompetitive effect and that such effects 
outweigh any of the conduct’s procompetitive benefits.39 These two rules illustrate 
the judiciary’s basic interpretation of the Sherman Act: the Act only prohibits 
unreasonable conduct that harms competition more than it promotes competition.40 
Whereas per se illegal conduct is characterized by its inherently unreasonable 
character, the rule of reason allows defendants to cast their behavior in the best 
possible light.41  
The judiciary’s reliance on measures of reasonableness represents its first major 
departure from the text of the statute. To reiterate, the Sherman Act prohibits “every 
                                                                                                             
 
 33. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972). 
 34. See Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 55 (“[Antitrust law] governs too 
vast and too complex an array of business practices to be reduced to a handful of categorical 
rules.”); Matthew G. Sipe, The Sherman Act and Avoiding Void-for-Vagueness, 45 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 709, 761 (2018) (arguing that the “deficiencies of the [Sherman Act’s] text” have 
resulted in “judicially-created rules that tolerate and maintain ambiguity”); Maurice E. Stucke, 
Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1378 (2009). 
 35. Stucke, supra note 34, at 1378 (“In determining the legality of restraints of trade, the 
Supreme Court generally employs either a per se or rule-of-reason standard.”); see also 
Oldham, supra note 11, at 320.  
 36.  See Price Fixing, Bid Rigging, and Market Allocation Schemes: What They Are and 
What to Look For, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/price-fixing-bid 
-rigging-and-market-allocation-schemes [https://perma.cc/C3HH-U3RR] (last updated June 
25, 2015). 
 37. HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at 233 (“The per se rule says that once we know a certain 
amount about a practice we can pass judgment on its legality without further inquiry.”); see 
also, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (summarizing the per se rule).  
 38. E.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at 233.  
 39. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S 231, 238 (1918) (summarizing 
the rule of reason); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 305, at 62–63.  
 40. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 305, at 62–63. 
 41. Id. 
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. . . combination . . . in restraint of trade.”42 The plain reading of that language was 
rejected early on when the judiciary reasoned instead that not every conceivable 
contract or combination is prohibited by the Act—only those that unreasonably 
restrain trade are prohibited.43 From the standpoint of logic and policy, this 
interpretation is undoubtedly desirable.44 Indeed, the function of all contracts is to 
restrain trade, and every market requires some degree of cooperation among those 
who might otherwise be competitors.45 This interpretation is not, however, grounded 
in a strictly plain reading of the text. 
Another major departure from the statute’s text occurred later on with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. United States Gypsum Co.46 Keep in 
mind: in terms of criminal liability the Sherman Act provides that “[e]very person 
who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby 
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”47 The Gypsum defendants 
faced criminal sanctions under this provision for engaging in a per se illegal price-
fixing scheme.48 The Court admitted that “[t]he Sherman Act, unlike most traditional 
criminal statutes, does not . . . precisely identify the conduct which it proscribes[,]” 
creating the possibility that even acts committed without criminal intent could lead 
to criminal liability.49 Then, without any textual reference to state of mind or intent, 
the Court held that criminal liability cannot be rendered under the Sherman Act 
unless the defendant possesses “knowledge of [the] probable consequences” of her 
conduct.50 Unlike other federal criminal statutes, the Sherman Act’s mens rea 
requirement is the product not of careful legislation, but of unavoidable judicial 
reasoning.51 
                                                                                                             
 
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (emphasis added).  
 43. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 238; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 
62–65 (1911); Robert Connolly, The Sherman Act is Unconstitutional as a Criminal Statute: 
(Part 1), CARTEL CAPERS (July 6, 2017), http://cartelcapers.com/blog/sherman-act 
-unconstitutional-criminal-statute-part-1/#_ftnref [https://perma.cc/C7XH-PMUG] (“[T]he 
first Supreme Court triage on the Sherman Act was that only ‘unreasonable restraints’ of trade 
were prohibited. But, that doesn’t clear things up too much—What is an unreasonable restraint 
of trade?” (footnote omitted)); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) 
(“Although [the Sherman Act’s] prohibition is literally all-encompassing, the courts have 
construed it as precluding only those contracts or combinations which ‘unreasonably’ restrain 
competition.” (citations omitted)); Baxter, supra note 5, at 668. 
 44. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y Prof. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) 
(explaining that if “read literally, § 1 would outlaw the entire body of private contract law,” 
which is a body of law that “enables competitive markets . . . to function effectively”). 
 45. Id. (“One problem presented by the language of § 1 of the Sherman Act is that it 
cannot mean what it says. The statute says that ‘every’ contract that restrains trade is unlawful. 
But . . . restraint is the very essence of every contract.”); Leslie supra note 2, at 890 (“[T]he 
text of Section 1 risks invalidating all contracts because every contract restrains trade in some 
way.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1, 3 (1984). 
 46. 438 U.S. 422 (1978). 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).  
 48. See Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 438.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 444. Prescribing such a prohibition on criminal intent is typically considered the 
job of the legislature. See infra Part III. 
 51. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 32–2721 (codifying federal crimes). 
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B. “Bright-Line” Rules 
Again, the Court’s departures from the text of the statute can be characterized as 
practical responses to the difficulties of impracticable language. Commerce would 
surely be stifled if every contract in restraint of trade were made illegal, and much 
procompetitive conduct might be discouraged if even well-intentioned behavior 
triggered criminal sanctions.52 But while the initial major departure involved what 
was an apparently clean distinction between two categories of conduct, the 
dichotomous per se versus rule of reason schema has gradually become less than 
clear.53  
The shift away from clean categories has most likely been impelled by the 
increased difficulty and complexity of Sherman Act cases.54 Indeed, the Court has 
admitted that “our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than 
terms like ‘per se’ . . . and ‘rule of reason’ tend to make them appear.”55 Nor does 
the Court deny that “there is often no bright line separating per se from [r]ule of 
[r]eason analysis.”56 In the Court’s estimation, “[p]er se rules may require 
considerable inquiry into market conditions before the evidence justifies a 
presumption of anticompetitive conduct.”57 And as the economy continues to 
modernize, the judiciary considers fewer and fewer behaviors appropriate for 
analysis under the per se rule.58  
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, for example, the Court held 
that minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) was a per se violation of the Sherman 
Act.59 Several decades later, exposed to new economic theories, the Court changed 
its mind about RPM. It held in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 
                                                                                                             
 
 52. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 303, at 44. But see Nash v. United States, 
229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (upholding the constitutionality of the Sherman Act’s vague text in 
light of defendant’s argument that “estimates may differ” as to the Act’s meaning, and that, 
therefore, “a man might find himself in prison because his honest judgment did not anticipate 
that of a jury of less competent men”).  
 53. Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 58, 67. 
 54. See id. at 55 (“Antitrust law . . . governs too vast and complex an array business 
practices to be reduced to a handful of categorical rules.”); Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 5 
(“The practices that come before the courts today are more complex . . . and the questions are 
more difficult.”).  
 55. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999) (emphasis omitted). 
 56. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 57. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104, n.26.  
 58. See Abbot B. Lipsky, Antitrust Economics—Making Progress, Avoiding Regression, 
12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 163 (2003) (observing that “the upsurge of antitrust economics has 
gone hand-in-hand with the abandonment of most per se rules”); Crane, Rules Versus 
Standards, supra note 20, at 84 (describing “the growing inclination toward fulsome review 
of the facts” and the growing inclination of courts to “reject bright-line rules”); Easterbrook, 
supra note 45, at 7. 
 59.  220 U.S. 373, 409 (1911). The term “resale price maintenance” describes an 
agreement between a supplier and a retailer in which the retailer agrees not to discount a 
product’s retail price below the level set by the supplier.  
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that RPM may carry procompetitive benefits in some situations and should therefore 
be analyzed under the rule of reason, rather than under the per se rule.60 
In addition to RPM, the list of conduct once considered appropriate for strict per 
se analysis—but no longer considered as such—includes maximum price 
maintenance,61 non-price vertical restraints,62 and even some forms of horizontal 
restraints. For instance, while tying has traditionally been considered per se illegal, 
it is typically analyzed under a rule that is “per se” in name only.63 In Broadcast 
Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., the court declined to apply per se analysis to a blanket 
licensing arrangement that facilitated a fix on prices.64 In NCAA v. Board of Regents 
of the University of Oklahoma, the Court declined to apply the per se rule to the 
NCAA’s limitation on televising college football games, even though the limitation 
fixed price and restricted output.65 The thing to take away from these cases is that 
although price fixing and other quintessential per se violations were once considered 
unquestionably anticompetitive, quintessentially anticompetitive behavior may be 
permitted if it is found to be economically efficient or beneficial.66  
But it’s not just the deterioration of the per se rule that fosters confusion. Even the 
rule of reason does not provide significant clarity or predictability. In Ohio v. 
American Express Co., the Court followed an unprecedented application of the rule 
of reason by inserting the concept of two-sided markets.67 The Court held that where 
a firm, such as a credit card company, serves different sets of customers in distinct 
but interrelated sides of a market, such as cardholders and merchants, plaintiffs must 
show that the defendant’s conduct had anticompetitive effects in both sides of the 
market.68 But prior to the Court’s ruling in American Express, it had been generally 
understood that markets should be defined narrowly. The Court had explained in 
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States that even if a firm serves two sides 
of a market, the analysis should be carefully focused on the side of the market that 
                                                                                                             
 
 60. 551 U.S. 877, 894 (2007). 
 61. Compare Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), with State Oil v. Khan, 522 
U.S. 3 (1997). 
 62. Compare United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), with 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 63. HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at 406–08 (explaining that “the so-called per se rule 
applied to tying arrangements is idiosyncratic” because it requires “proof of market power” 
and allows defendants to “offer various defenses”). Compare United States v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 
356 U.S. 1 (1958) (declaring that tying is appropriate for per se analysis), with Jefferson Parish 
Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (declining to apply per se analysis to a hospital’s tie-
in of anesthesiological services). See also, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 
(D.C. Cir. 2001 (applying rule of reason analysis to a tie-in executed as a bundled discount).  
 64. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23, 24 (1979) (“[W]e have some 
doubt—enough to counsel against application of the per se rule—about the extent to which 
[issuance of blanket licenses] threatens . . . competitive pricing . . . . we cannot agree that it 
should automatically be declared illegal . . . .”). 
 65. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984). 
 66. See, e.g., id.  
 67. 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). Cf. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 
(1953) (examining the market for newspaper readers independently from the interrelated 
market for newspaper advertising space). 
 68. See Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2286–88. 
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was harmed by the anticompetitive conduct.69 This is exactly what the Court declined 
to do in American Express, even though nearly all markets can be understood as two-
sided.70 The Court’s adoption of a two-sided market theory is a slippery slope that 
may allow firms to demonstrate the reasonableness of their anticompetitive conduct 
if they can show that it only harmed one side of a two-sided market.71 
Beyond the doctrinal confusion it causes, confusion over the rules’ inner and outer 
contours has been experienced by firms in the form of increased litigation costs.72 
The value of the per se rule is attributable in part to the prelitigation cost savings 
generated by its simplicity: less to prove means less discovery, which limits parties’ 
expenses and conserves judicial resources.73 Indeed, as the Court has observed, the 
per se rule “avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged 
economic investigation into the entire history of the industr[ies] involved” just to 
figure out whether particular conduct caused unreasonable harm to competition.74 
But when everything is relevant, as it is under the rule of reason, the disposition of 
most cases is far from simple.75 Doctrinal ambiguity and new conceptions of 
economic theory necessitate that courts wait until after discovery to determine 
whether the per se rule or the rule of reason should apply.76 Even if a per se violation 
is alleged, parties cannot be sure whether a court will decide that per se analysis is 
appropriate until voluminous documents are assessed, several experts are consulted, 
and many facts are developed.77 Thus, parties may end up litigating through 
discovery and absorbing the costs of rule of reason litigation nonetheless.78 If only 
post-discovery rule determinations are possible, the per se rule forfeits the value of 
its cost-reducing function.79  
                                                                                                             
 
 69. See id. at 2295 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 594 (1953). 
 70. See Lina M. Khan, The Supreme Court Case That Could Give Tech Giants More 
Power, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/opinion/the 
-supreme-court-case-that-could-give-tech-giants-more-power.html [https://perma.cc/W2P9 
-H2NP]. For example, Amazon provides a platform that connects buyers and sellers of goods; 
Facebook and Google connect users and advertisers; Uber and Lyft facilitate a market between 
riders and drivers; Apple links app makers with app users; Spotify and Pandora connect 
musicians and listeners; banks provide platforms for depositors and borrowers; and airports 
facilitate trade between airlines and travelers. Id.; see also Khan, supra note 18, at 325 (2018) 
(describing various forms of power possessed by firms that provide two-sided platforms). 
 71. See Khan, supra note 18. For instance, if Uber instituted an exclusivity agreement 
prohibiting its drivers from also driving for Lyft, Uber drivers would be anticompetitively 
harmed. But Uber might be able to escape antitrust scrutiny if it could demonstrate that the 
other side of the market—riders—were not harmed by the exclusivity agreement. Id. 
 72. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 311, at 241; see also Crane, Rules Versus 
Standards, supra note 20, at 83 (“Per se rules of illegality are often vastly overbroad but an 
open-ended rule of reason approach would create excessive litigation costs and uncertainty.”). 
 73. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 305, at 68–70. 
 74. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
 75. See Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 9 (“When everything is relevant, nothing is 
dispositive.”). 
 76. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 311, at 241; see also Easterbrook, supra note 
45, at 7 (“We canot condemn so quickly anymore. What we do not condemn, we must study. 
The approved method of study is the Rule of Reason.”). 
 77. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 311, at 241–42. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. The Court attempted its own solution to this litigation expense problem by 
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Given the dynamism of the interpretive approach Congress prescribed the 
Sherman Act, a relative lack of clarity and predictability is probably par for the 
course.80 It has been argued, furthermore, that given Sherman Act interpreters’ 
arduous task of applying murky doctrine to highly nuanced facts, a degree of 
confusion must be tolerated.81 But requests for tolerance downplay the judiciary’s 
limited ability to resolve complex economic issues by way of open-ended 
examinations into the costs and benefits of any particular course of conduct.82 The 
judiciary seems, as a result, to have embraced the invitation to “ramble through the 
wilds.”83 Clean analytical categories have largely taken a backseat to a post-hoc, fact-
intensive balancing approach.84 As a result, the doctrine has become cluttered with 
“diverse and even contradictory strains,”85 “decisions that now seem blunders,”86 and 
“substantial doctrinal confusion, if not plain error.”87  
The judiciary’s failure to appreciate the economics of restraints on trade and the 
methods by which colluders succeed creates a breeding ground for confusion.88 The 
Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that the judiciary is “ill-equppied and ill-
suited” to “analyze, interpret, and evaluate the myriad of competing interests and the 
endless data that [is] brought to bear on such decisions.”89 The reality is that in light 
of the alarming level of power held by firms wielding new technologies and new 
                                                                                                             
 
integrating a threshold “triaging” tool, which has asserted its own impact on the deterioration 
of the dichotomous structure of section 1. See Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, 
at 61. This preliminary inquiry, often referred to as the “quick look” rule, involves a truncated 
analysis which is more elaborate than per se examination, but not quite a full-fledged rule of 
reason analysis. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (observing that the 
basis for “abbreviated or ‘quick look’ analysis” was formed by the collection of FTC v. Ind. 
Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 
85 (1984); and Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)). Needless 
to say, it is not entirely clear which cases are appropriate for a quick look analysis; plus, even 
after the quick look, parties may end up litigating under the rule of reason anyway. AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 305, at 73–74. 
 80. See Baxter, supra note 5, at 671. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 916–17 
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“How easily can courts identify instances in which the benefits 
are likely to outweigh potential harms? . . . . [N]ot very easily . . . . One cannot fairly expect 
judges and juries in such cases to apply complex economic criteria without making a 
considerable number of mistakes . . . .”) (emphasis omitted); see also Easterbrook, supra note 
45, at 9 (“[J]udges cannot do what such open-ended formulas require.”). 
 83. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972). 
 84. Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 51, 58 (describing “the growing 
inclination toward fulsome review of the facts” and the growing inclination of courts to “reject 
bright-line rules”). 
 85. BORK, supra note 8, at 36.  
 86. Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 2. 
 87. Baxter, supra note 5, at 671. 
 88. See Bork, supra note 8, at 48 (observing that a judge’s responsibility is that of 
“continually creating and recreating the Sherman Act out of his understanding of economics”); 
Leslie, supra note 2, at 893, 894. See generally Baye & Wright, supra note 16. 
 89. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611–12 (1972). 
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business models,90 the economic analysis required for deciding Sherman Act cases 
demands more technological and data-driven economic expertise than it once did.91  
II. SHOULD WE CALL IN THE EXPERTS? 
Our increasingly modernized economy demands that our regulatory approach be 
updated in stride.92 The gradual influx of microeconomics and post-hoc examination 
of facts has steadily increased the role economists and industry experts play in 
antitrust.93 Yet, economic theories and microeconomic analyses are not always easily 
articulated to the judiciary.94 More can be done to make Sherman Act regulation a 
formally expert-driven administrative enterprise rather than a generalist-driven 
adjudicative one.95 A more optimal level of clarity and predictability might be 
achieved by integrating some level of antitrust agency rulemaking.96 This Part briefly 
considers the idea that an agency rulemaking solution makes the most sense given 
that Sherman Act interpreters (the judiciary) and enforcers (the FTC and the DOJ) 
already approximate agency rulemaking to some degree.  
A. Approximating Agency Rulemaking 
First, like agencies during notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Court relies on 
external sources of analytical and empirical information to parse through difficult 
theoretical arguments.97 Because the judiciary is comprised mostly of generalist 
judges, it must somehow make up for its lack of access to powerful empirical and 
analytical tools.98 The Court cannot simply rely on litigants to do all the heavy 
analytical lifting; litigants advocate their economic analyses in ways that favor the 
                                                                                                             
 
 90. See Khan, supra note 18, at 325. 
 91. See Haw, supra note 9, at 1263.  
 92. See generally Comment of Fed. Trade Comm’r Rohit Chopra, supra note 27 
(outlining the need for an updated antitrust enforcement approach). 
 93. See Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 50. (“As antitrust has become 
de-politicized and de-ideologized, flexible technocratic expertise has replaced legalist 
conceptualism. Once the stars of the antitrust courtroom, lawyers now play the supporting cast 
to economists.”); Lipsky, supra note 58, at 165 (“[R]apid assimilation of microeconomics into 
antitrust thinking makes almost every antitrust controversy an exercise in microeconomic 
analysis.”). 
 94. See, e.g., Baye & Wright, supra note 16. 
 95. See Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 1160 (celebrating antitrust’s 
technocratic shift); Lipsky, supra note 58, at 164 (exploring how antitrust’s economic 
revolution can be advanced to the next stage). But see Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, 
Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2544 (2013) (criticizing antitrust’s 
technocratic shift as an “unbalanced system [that] puts too much control in the hands of 
technical experts, moving antitrust enforcement too far away from its democratic roots”).  
 96. See generally Haw, supra note 9. 
 97. Id. at 1248. 
 98. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 107.  
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outcomes they seek.99 Naturally, then, the Court must often rely on third-party 
sources of information, such as academic studies and data.100  
The Court seems to place significant weight on the perspectives of interested 
parties who participate in antitrust cases as an amicus curiae.101 As amici, trade 
associations, companies, professors, and others offer their own empirical data and 
perspectives.102 Interested parties lobby the Court for a preferred rule much the way 
these same parties submit comments to administrative agencies.103 But under the 
adjudicative approach, it is difficult to predict how an inexpert court will discriminate 
between opposing versions of an economic theory.104 
Leegin, which overturned the Court’s century-old ban on RPM, is a good example 
of the Court’s agency rulemaking approximation.105 The Leegin Court relied 
significantly on amicus briefs signed by more than two dozen economists,106 which 
theorized the procompetitive benefits of RPM and offered empirical data 
highlighting the costs of applying the per se rule to RPM.107 The Court cited to the 
amici’s arguments on multiple occasions,108 demonstrating that the Court placed 
some weight on the amici’s perspectives, much as an agency would do during notice-
and-comment rulemaking.109 More recently, in American Express, the majority 
opinion was littered with citations to secondary sources discussed by amici.110 There, 
                                                                                                             
 
 99. Haw, supra note 9, at 1260.  
 100. See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2295 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(noting that there is no support in antitrust law for treating a two-sided market as a singular 
whole).  
 101. See generally Stephen Calkins, The Antitrust Conversation, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 625 
(2001) (examining the influence of amici in particular cases and noting that “[a]lthough many 
important antitrust cases were written without benefit of amici . . . amicus participation has 
helped shape the doctrine we apply every day”). See also Crane, Rules Versus Standards, 
supra note 20, at 96 (observing that “amicus curiae briefs can exert considerable influence” 
and that “[a]ffected constituencies frequently attempt to shape antitrust decisions”); Haw, 
supra note 9 at 1248 (arguing that “help with understanding economic theory and interpreting 
empirical data on competition . . . comes from amicus briefs” which “often present more 
economic arguments than the parties’ briefs” and which “receive considerable attention from 
the Court and influence its opinions”). 
 102. Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 96; Haw, supra note 9, at 1248. 
 103. See Haw, supra note 9, at 1259; see also Calkins, supra note 101, at 652 (“In fact, 
amici have long played a key role in addressing the intersection between the per se rule and 
the rule of reason.”). 
 104. See Lipsky, supra note 58, at 175. 
 105. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.  PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). Rebecca 
Haw Allensworth also outlines Linkline as a salient example. See Haw, supra note 9, at 1270 
(discussing Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns., Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009)). Other 
examples outlined by Stephen Calkins include State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); and, among others, Continental 
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See Calkins, supra note 101. 
 106. Haw, supra note 9, at 1280–84. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285–87 (2018); see also Calkins, 
supra note 101, at 633 (“[W]hen the Court relies significantly on legal and economics 
secondary sources discussed by amici . . . it is at least possible that amici made a difference.”). 
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the Court’s reliance on external theories to map out the concept of two-sided markets 
was clear. And, as in Leegin, where the Court completely departed from precedent, 
the American Express Court departed from earlier precedent instructing that market 
analysis should be defined narrowly.111  
Like the Court, the DOJ approximates certain aspects of formal rulemaking. 
Guidance documents promulgated by the DOJ bear resemblance to rulemakings but 
lack the benefits of formal notice and comment.112 Take the DOJ’s no-poach 
guidance, for example.113 Published in 2016, the no-poach guidance alerted firms 
that agreements between employers to refrain from recruiting each other’s employees 
would be subject to criminal sanctions.114 Prior to 2016, no-poach agreements were 
only enforced by civil remedies.115 Needless to say, spurred by the possibility of 
criminal fines or imprisonment, firms have scrambled to ensure compliance.116 Even 
though the no-poach guidance is not a binding policy,117 the DOJ has stuck to its 
word and begun pursuing firms that employ no-poaching agreements.118  
A major issue with the no-poach guidance is that it announced, almost without 
notice, a novel enforcement position and a new risk of criminal liability. Yet, 
interested and effected parties were not afforded a formal opportunity to weigh in.119 
Of course, whether the Supreme Court will ultimately interpret the Sherman Act such 
that no-poach agreements fall within the scope of its criminal prohibitions is 
unclear.120 If the Court relies on amicus briefs in determining the criminality of no-
poach agreements—briefs which may, for example, parse through theories of 
competition in low-skilled labor markets—one result may be heightened uncertainty 
among the governed public over the judiciary’s willingness to acquiesce to DOJ 
enforcement positions that create new per se violations, as well as new criminally 
enforceable per se violations. The broader consequence: an even more blurred line 
between the per se rule and the rule of reason. 
                                                                                                             
 
 111. See American Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2274; Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 
345 U.S. 594, 594 (1953).  
 112. See, e.g., NO-POACH GUIDANCE, supra note 15.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See, e.g., Corman et al., supra note 15. 
 117. See Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. on the Prohibition on Improper Guidance 
Documents (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1012271 
/download [https://perma.cc/SY8X-BRFW]. 
 118. See, e.g., James Doubek, 8 Restaurant Chains Agree to End ‘No-Poach’ Agreements 
Under Threat of Lawsuit, NPR (Aug. 22, 2018, 3:45 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/22 
/640776195/8-fast-food-companies-agree-to-end-no-poach-agreements-under-threat-of 
-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/24RT-CTX3]; Victoria Graham, Justice Department to Pursue 
Healthcare ‘No-Poach’ Cases, Official Says, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 27, 2018), 
https://www.bna.com/justice-dept-pursue-n73014476113 [https://perma.cc/D4AZ-Y44B].  
 119. See NO-POACH GUIDANCE, supra note 15. 
 120. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Knorr and 
Wabtec to Terminate Unlawful Agreements Not to Compete for Employees (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-knorr-and-wabtec-terminate 
-unlawful-agreements-not-compete [https://perma.cc/WEH6-YBW2] (noting the DOJ’s 
decision not to pursue criminal charges against two rail equipment suppliers). 
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Clarity and predictability are paramount in a field as impactful and esoteric as 
antitrust.121 To be sure, the text of the Sherman Act is so vague and so broad that it 
makes sense for the Court to draw on as much information as possible and for the 
DOJ to provide at least some clarity by way of guidance documents.122  But if textual 
vagueness and judicial inability to perform empirical analyses necessitates reliance 
on expert input and guidance documents, it makes more sense to let the experts just 
write the rules in the first place.123 Of course, leaving first-instance Sherman Act 
interpretation in the hands of the judiciary carries some advantages. Such advantages 
include the ability to “create law with actual facts in sight”; to remain “incremental, 
adaptive, and flexible”; to “disperse decisionmaking power” horizontally and 
vertically; and to avoid “agency-capture problems.”124  
However, any such advantages can easily be construed as disadvantages as well. 
For example, dispersing decisionmaking power broadly is not significantly 
advantageous, if at all, if the decisionmakers lack the requisite expertise. And while 
an antitrust agency might be captured by industry interests, the judiciary can also be 
captured by intellectual or attitudinal trends.125 For instance, as evidenced by the 
contemporary predominance of the consumer welfare standard, as opposed to a total 
welfare or competitive process standard, the Court was arguably “captured” by the 
Chicago School theories that came to prominence in the 1970s.126  
While potential advantages of the adjudicative approach can be debated, the fact 
remains that the judiciary is unable to produce expert economic analyses on its own 
and must rely on outside input to solve complex economic issues.127 The judiciary is 
not optimally positioned to resolve disputes over economic competition.128 An 
antitrust agency, on the other hand, could write rules addressing RPM or two-sided 
markets or no-poach agreements after conducting its own studies and allowing 
interested parties to weigh in during notice and comment. As a result, the benefits of 
formal notice-and-comment rulemaking, clarity and predictability among them, 
might be realized more keenly than under the adjudicative model.  
B. DOJ or FTC? 
The difficult question concerns which agency should be authorized to promulgate 
rules under the Sherman Act. Congress’s grant of regulatory authority to the FTC 
—an independent agency with both adjudicative power and rulemaking authority 
—reflects Congress’s recognition that protecting consumer welfare requires 
                                                                                                             
 
 121. See Comment of Fed. Trade Comm’r Rohit Chopra, supra note 27; Hearings on 
Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, supra note 22. 
 122. See Haw, supra note 9, at 1268. 
 123. But see Crane, Technocracy, supra note 20, at 1190 (describing the potential 
advantages the adjudicatory model might have over an administrative model).  
 124. Id. 
 125. See Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 98. 
 126. See infra text accompanying note 192.  
 127. See Haw, supra note 9, at 1263. 
 128. See Crane, Technocracy, supra note 20, at 1193 (“Adjudication’s ‘all-or-nothing’ 
structure is ill suited for antitrust . . . . [A]ntitrust is about solving modern industrial-
organization problems, not about expressing social values or similar democratic functions.”). 
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specialized decision-making.129 Plus, a series of hearings held by the FTC in the fall 
of 2018 and an expressed willingness to utilize its rulemaking capabilities reflects 
the sense that clearer and more effective rules are in order.130  
One issue with the agency solution is that the FTC’s Bureau of Competition 
awkwardly shares regulatory jurisdiction with the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, but only 
the DOJ is authorized to enforce the Sherman Act’s criminal provisions. In some 
ways, this adds to the difficultly faced by firms in predicting what kind of regulatory 
attention their conduct might invite. Not only are parties required to speculate as to 
whether their conduct will be subject to per se or rule of reason analysis, they also 
must speculate whether their cases will be heard by an Article III court or an 
administrative law judge. Still, the antitrust agencies have investigative abilities and 
subject matter expertise that the Court does not.131  
Though the mechanics of the agency solution are beyond the scope of this Note, 
shifting the authority to interpret the Sherman Act to the FTC or DOJ could facilitate 
the adoption of clearer, more predictable rules.132 Indeed, the judiciary’s reliance on 
amicus briefs in Sherman Act cases and the DOJ’s use of nonbinding guidance 
documents may resemble agency decision-making enough that formalizing Sherman 
Act notice-and-comment rulemaking makes the most sense.133 But apart from the 
mechanical issues of the agency solution, there might also be some constitutional 
obstacles. Part III considers whether the vagueness of the Sherman Act’s language 
raises separation of powers and fairness concerns such that, absent a significant 
legislative update to the Act’s language, the agency solution is a moot point. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO THE AGENCY SOLUTION 
To be sure, the Sherman Act’s sparse text and accompanying body of doctrine are 
not viewed across the board as problematic—at least not constitutionally 
problematic.134 The prevailing view is that the Court’s interpretive leeway is far-
reaching, but constitutionally permitted.135 Nonetheless, the Act has been called an 
impermissibly broad delegation of legislative power and an unconstitutionally vague 
statute.136 While it has not been successfully challenged on these grounds since its 
enactment,137 the Act may now be more vulnerable to separation of powers and 
                                                                                                             
 
 129. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 302, at 13–15. 
 130. Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, supra note 
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vagueness attacks in light of its expanded coverage and the contemporary challenges 
of regulating competition.138  
A. Impermissible Vagueness 
The appropriateness of the Act’s criminal penalties is not free from scrutiny, 
although the utility of its criminal penalties is plain enough.139 Imprisonment of 
individual corporate officials surely deters reprehensible conduct in a way that 
issuing an injunction or dipping into a corporation’s treasuries does not.140 Yet, on 
its face, the Act’s language does not purport to preclude the possibility that a 
defendant may be imprisoned after an ex post finding by a jury that his conduct was 
economically unreasonable—regardless of whether it was morally reprehensible.141 
If actualized, such a possibility might chill commercial conduct that would be 
economically beneficial to society and undeserving of the pain and stigma of criminal 
punishment.142 Moreover, laws like the Sherman Act that do not clearly define their 
prohibitions may, in practical effect, impermissibly delegate fundamental policy 
questions to adjudicators for ad hoc resolution.143 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that criminal statutes be “sufficiently 
explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render 
them liable to its penalties.”144 Generally speaking, a statute is unconstitutionally 
vague if “[persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning 
and differ as to its application.”145 But the Court does not apply the vagueness 
doctrine simplistically, and certain considerations may alleviate concerns over an 
otherwise vague statute.146 For example, if the general class of conduct to which a 
statute is directed falls plainly within the statute’s terms, the Court likely will not 
strike the statute just because marginal cases may raise doubts.147  
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Unlike other criminal statutes, though, the Sherman Act requires an unusual level 
of interpretation.148 This was made especially evident during the decades 
immediately following the Act’s passage, when the Court began to guess at the 
meaning of its prohibitions.149 As discussed in Section I.A, the Court declared that 
the Act’s language does not mean what it actually says: the Court interpreted “every” 
restraint of trade to mean only “unreasonable” restraints of trade.150 Still, to be sure, 
the judiciary is generally free to shape the character of criminal prohibitions by 
interpreting statutes against varying factual circumstances.151 The judiciary is not, 
however, permitted to create common law crimes,152 even if the harm caused by 
certain conduct warrants criminal sanctions in the overwhelming majority of cases. 
Consider an argument the DOJ once made before the Seventh Circuit: “Since the 
per se rules define types of restraints that are illegal without further inquiry into their 
competitive reasonableness . . . . It is as if the Sherman Act read: ‘An agreement 
among competitors to rig bids is illegal.’”153 But, in fact, the statute does not read 
that way. The Sherman Act could include the words “bid-rigging” or “price-fixing” 
or “no-poach,” but it does not. It says nothing about limiting criminal penalties to a 
single judicially created category of conduct.154 It says nothing about criminal intent 
or categorical unreasonabless.155 Such interpretations have instead been worked out 
by the Court and by litigants—case-by-case, claim-by-claim. 
The nature of modern-day commerce and the lack of any substantive legislative 
updates call into question whether the Act still—if it ever did—sufficiently informs 
potential defendants of the conduct that could subject them to criminal 
punishment.156 Perhaps the Court’s addition of a mens rea element and its distinction 
between per se and rule of reason have compensated for any lack of fair notice.157 
Indeed, no void-for-vagueness challenge against the Sherman Act has ever 
succeeded.158 Yet, the Act’s coverage of unreasonable restraints of trade has greatly 
expanded.159 No-poaching agreements, for example, were not always considered an 
inherently unreasonable restraint of trade; once they were considered as such, no-
poaching agreements were enforced by civil remedies until the 2016 guidance 
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document declared that they warranted criminal sanctions.160 Whether a non-binding 
guidance document constitutes sufficient notice that no-poach agreements are a 
crime is highly debatable. But interpretative developments like the no-poach 
guidance have arguably fashioned unlegislated crimes, signaling that the Act may 
not provide fair notice.161  
B. Controversiality of Administrative Crimes 
Another issue implicated by the Sherman Act’s criminal arm is that delegating 
interpretive authority to an antitrust agency may undermine basic philosophies of 
criminal liability.162 Criminal punishment reflects society’s contempt for certain 
conduct, but when a governmental body other than Congress is authorized to 
promulgate and enforce criminally punishable prohibitions, society’s voice is not 
heard as loudly.163 The Sherman Act was written with such generality that delegation 
to an antitrust agency without meaningfully updated language may do little more 
than authorize the agency to create controversial administrative crimes.164  
The Court has hesitated at times over the degree of deference it should afford to 
administrative crimes.165 In Fahey v. Mallonee, for example, the Court postulated 
that delegation of rulemaking authority “might not be allowable to authorize creation 
of new crimes.”166 The Court later signaled in Touby v. United States that “greater 
congressional specificity [may be] required in the criminal context,” but that 
precedent is unclear on this question.167 The Court’s hesitancy reflects concerns that 
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the power to define crimes—that is, to codify the moral judgements of society—
should belong to Congress, rather than administrative agencies.168 While agency 
administrators are often the top experts in their substantive fields, they are probably 
not the appropriate arbiters of society’s moral persuasion.169  
Since Touby, the Court has not reconsidered the intelligible principle standard’s 
low barrier in the context of agencies interpreting vague criminal statutes. But the 
possibility remains open.170 At least three of the sitting Justices have since questioned 
the propriety of administrative crimes, as well as the efficacy of the nondelegation 
doctrine.171 Despite no official condemnation of administrative crimes, the future 
possibility thereof could stymie a delegation of rulemaking authority to an antitrust 
agency.  
C. Unguided Agency Authorizations 
Notwithstanding the Sherman Act’s dual criminal-civil character, it has long been 
recognized as a general principle that Congress cannot shift its legislative power to 
other branches of the federal government.172 This principle, referred to as the 
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nondelegation doctrine, is integral to the preservation of our tripartite system of 
government.173 Yet, despite its importance, determining how and when to apply the 
nondelegation doctrine is not an easy task.174 The Court struggled early on to draw a 
workable line between permissible and impermissible delegations.175 Even after 
declaring it universally recognized that Congress cannot delegate legislative power, 
the Court eventually acquiesced to this line-drawing difficulty after the Great 
Depression.176  
The “intelligible principle” standard, by which the Court has traditionally 
determined whether a delegation offends the separation of powers, is extremely 
deferential to Congress’s need for regulatory assistance.177 Under this standard, a 
congressional delegation will be constitutionally agreeable so long as the enabling 
legislation contains an explicit and intelligible principle to guide the agency as it 
exercises the regulatory authority conferred upon it.178 Intelligible principles need 
not be articulated with any serious specificity. For instance, Congress authorized the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to ensure holding companies’ corporate 
structures do not “unduly or unnecessarily complicate” or “unfairly or inequitably 
distribute” shareholders’ voting power.179 Similarly, the Federal Communications 
Commission was charged with regulating broadcast licensing according to “public 
interest, convenience, or necessity.”180 The Court held that the intelligible principle 
standard had been satisfied in both instances.181 
The text of the Sherman Act may not, to the contrary, contain an ostensible 
intelligible principle.182 The Act broadly prohibits conduct “in restraint of trade” 
without defining restraint of trade and without mentioning, for example, public 
                                                                                                             
 
directly”). 
 173. See Kritikos, supra note 172. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile the doctrine of 
unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a fundamental element of our constitutional 
system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the courts.”); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 
1, 42–43 (1825) (explaining that deciding the boundary at which to demarcate the permissible 
from the impermissible requires a delicate inquiry with no clear-cut answers). But see Gary 
Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 395 (2002) (positing that it 
is no more difficult to draw a line between execution and lawmaking than it is to draw a line 
between reasonable and unreasonable searches and seizures).  
 176. See, e.g., Field, 143 U.S. at 692 (1892); see also Kritikos, supra note 172, at 442. 
Only twice since then has the Court held a delegation unconstitutional. See Whitman, 531 U.S. 
at 474–75. The court found an unconstitutional delegation in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 
293 U.S. 388 (1935), and another in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 
U.S. 495 (1935). 
 177. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); see also 
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943). Perhaps insignificantly, the Court later 
added that Congress must also delineate the outer boundaries of the delegated authority. See 
Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946). 
 178. See J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 406. 
 179. Am. Power & Light, 329 U.S. at 104.  
 180. NBC, 319 U.S. at 225–26. 
 181. Am. Power & Light, 329 U.S. at 104; NBC, 319 U.S. at 225–26. 
 182. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).   
1244 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 94:1223 
 
interest,183 protection of small businesses, or any other guiding principle.184 The 
Act’s few words say nothing about how to determine whether trade has in fact been 
restrained or when a would-be restraint of trade should be overlooked because of the 
benefits it confers.185 Some would argue that the measuring stick should be whether 
conduct affects the democratic process;186 others would argue the size and structure 
of firms is the better guidepost.187 But because the Act says nothing to that effect, the 
doctrine has come to represent the Court’s struggle to “settle on an intelligible 
principle of [its] own choosing.”188 
During the latter half of the twentieth century the Court settled on the principle 
articulated by Robert Bork, commonly considered the most influential scholar of 
modern antitrust theory.189 Bork maintained that in framing the Sherman Act broadly, 
Congress left the courts free to frame subsidiary rules so long as such rules are geared 
toward the advancement of consumer welfare.190 The ultimate goal of the Sherman 
Act, said Bork, should be to “improve allocative efficiency without impairing 
productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer 
welfare.”191 That is, Sherman Act regulation should be executed in a way that ensures 
societal resources are both produced effectively by firms and expended on tasks 
consumers value most.192  
It may be that such a goal, which has guided antitrust jurisprudence since the late 
1970s,193 provides an intelligible principle suitable to guide Sherman Act 
interpreters.194 The problem is that Congress did not reference the consumer welfare 
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standard in the Act. And there was no consensus on the Court before 1979 that it 
should be singularly guided by the goal of maximizing consumer welfare.195 Of 
course, Congress could insert a consumer welfare provision into the Sherman Act. 
The likelihood of this, however, is low—especially in light of energized calls for a 
reformulated standard that measures welfare more holistically.196 Either way, the 
Sherman Act’s language does not explicitly state a guiding standard at all. Without 
such, a delegation of interpretive authority to an antitrust agency may run afoul of 
the nondelegation doctrine.  
CONCLUSION 
The Sherman Act, by its vague and sweeping language, is a broad delegation of 
authority to the Supreme Court. Congress sent us into the wilderness—law students 
and generalist judges alike. In light of swelling desire for the antitrust laws to be 
more effective against modern-day competition foes, Congress should update the 
Sherman Act. The common-law approach has not achieved the stability one would 
expect of a statute levying hefty criminal sanctions, and the Court appears to 
approximate agency rulemaking on an increasingly frequent basis. Delegating 
rulemaking authority to an antitrust agency may be a viable solution. But there are 
some draw backs—namely constitutional objections to which the Sherman Act may 
be vulnerable, especially if an agency delegation were not accompanied by some 
level of additional statutory clarity. Even if the agency solution proves unworkable, 
Congress should address head-on the growing need for clarity, predictability, and 
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